The Case
Wilkinson v. Farmers Holding Companies involved a dispute under a Missouri statute about an employee’s post-termination rights to a “service letter” stating the nature and duration of his service. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment for the company based on the company’s argument that it was not the actual employer. The Supreme Court’s decision addressed only the procedural law regarding summary judgment and plaintiff’s failure to abide by the procedures of Rule 74.04 in responding to summary judgment.
In particular, the Court noted that although the Plaintiff’s “point relied on” argued that summary judgment is an extreme and drastic remedy, it hasn’t been considered an “extreme and drastic remedy” since the Court’s 1993 decision in ITT Comm. Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp.
The ITT Decision and Its Legacy
Before ITT, courts had often spoken of summary judgment as an “extreme and drastic remedy” that shouldn’t be granted if there was the “slightest doubt” as to the existence of any issue of material fact. Some commentators had even said that summary judgment “border[ed] on denial of due process in that it denie[ed] the opposing party his day in court.”
But the Court in ITT expressly rejected the idea that summary judgment denies due process, rejected the “slightest doubt” standard for finding a genuine dispute to defeat summary judgment, and rejected the idea that summary judgment is extreme or drastic.
Still, in the 33 years since ITT was handed down, courts of appeals have sometimes repeated these pre-ITT warnings against summary judgment as an “extreme and drastic remedy” bordering on a denial of due process.
- Some cases cited cases before the ITT decision. For example,Walters Bender Strohbehn & Vaughan, P.C. v. Mason, 316 S.W.3d 475, 481 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) cited “extreme and drastic remedy” language from the pre-ITT case Ross v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Commc’ns Corp., 836 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992)
- Some decisions even went so far as to quote ITT itself for apparent support of these pre-ITT notions. For example, in Boone Cty. v. Cty. Emples. Ret. Fund, 26 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000)—a case explicitly mentioned in Wilkinson—the Western District cited Horner v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999) as quoting ITT for the “extreme and drastic remedy” language.
Wilkinson Adheres to the ITT Decision
Wilkinson lays all this to rest and makes clear that ITT really meant what it said: “to the extent this Court’s opinions or opinions of the court of appeals hold or suggest summary judgment is an extreme or drastic remedy, those cases should no longer be followed.”
The Supreme Court’s directive in Wilkinson—that summary judgment should be a real and viable option for litigants—couldn’t be more timely, especially given the Court’s recent holdings that had effectively weakened the motion to dismiss as a real option.
Wilkinson in the Post-Bell Landscape
For instance, in Bell v. Shelter Insurance, the Court held that even though the motion to dismiss hinged on a “question of law to be decided by the courts, it would be premature to answer that question definitively on a motion to dismiss, for which the only inquiry is whether the plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim.” (emphasis in original) Instead, the Court said whether the plaintiff’s interpretation of the contract was “actually correct is a matter for summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or trial.” Bell v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 701 S.W.3d 614, 619 (Mo. 2024). In light of Bell and its progeny, it only makes sense that summary judgment should be a real and viable option, not an “extreme and drastic remedy.”
Interestingly, after Bell, the Missouri and federal rules both now appear to require virtually the opposite on their face from what they actually require in practice for pleading standards.
On its face, the federal rule claims to require only notice pleading (“a short and plain statement of the claim” under Federal Rule 8), but requires pleading facts sufficient to state a plausible claim since the Supreme Court’s Twombley and Iqbal decisions and disregards conclusory allegations when making that determination. Conversely, the Missouri rule requires fact pleading on its face (“a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” under Rule 55.05), but now effectively only requires notice pleading, given that Bell said even legal questions can’t be disposed of on a motion to dismiss.
Conclusion
One could, of course, argue about the reasoning of Bell and its consistency with Missouri Rules 55.05 or 55.27. But the simple fact is, the more Missouri courts embrace notice pleading and weaken the motion to dismiss as a workable option, the more necessary it becomes to strengthen summary judgment as a viable alternative to test the adequacy of a plaintiff’s case before spending judicial resources at trial. Wilkinson appears to be a step in that direction.